Risk of introduction of the Ebola virus into
Brazil -Brazil has a coastal frontier of 7,367 km and its terrestrial limits are its borders with 10 other South American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, French Guiana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela) with a total length of the order of 16,886 km. Thus, this is a very extensive terrestrial border along which it is difficult to control the entry of people from other countries. This is particularly so in relation to the countries that border the Brazilian Amazon Region: Bolivia, Colombia, Guyana, French Guiana, Suriname, Peru and Venezuela. On the other hand, more than 25 ports and 20 international airports open up Brazil to the whole world, not only by means of maritime and air transport directly between Brazil and Africa, but also particularly from African countries to Europe and other continents and from there to Brazil. According to the World Tourism Organization, in 2012 Brazil received 5.6 million visitors (2014 estimate 6.4 million), however no African country was among the top 20 sending countries.
A study conducted by the Biological System Modeling Laboratory of Northeastern University in the USA, in September 2014, investigated the risk associated with the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 (Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria). The study covered 220 countries and Brazil was in 30th place, with a 5% risk of importing the virus by 31 October 2014. This represented a high short-term risk. It is to be hoped that this prediction does not become a reality, but preparations need to be made for such an emergency, until such time that the World Health Organization considers that the epidemic in West Africa or in any other country has been brought under control. Given the long incubation period of the disease, it is recognised that it is not an easy task to avoid the entry of individuals who are still in the asymptomatic phase or to detect symptomatic individuals at ports, airports and especially at the terrestrial borders, particularly those with countries in the Amazon Region. Nonetheless, in the light of this emergency regarding the possibility of introduction of the Ebola virus into Brazil, integrated surveillance measures are being introduced by the Ministries of Health, Justice and Foreign Relations at Brazil's borders in relation to individuals with possible Ebola virus infection, as follows: (i) detailed review of documentation regarding the origin of passengers arriving at terrestrial, port and airport borders, (ii) establishment of brief questionnaires about countries visited over the preceding 30 days and any manifestations of symptoms that may have resulted from Ebola virus infection, (iii) review of the quarantine law in relation to individuals with suspected Ebola disease, (iv) guidance from the Foreign Ministry for Brazilian citizens who live in countries that are at risk of Ebola disease and for those who come from abroad to Brazil and, lastly, (v) the Ministry of Health has the responsibility for surveillance and medical healthcare for suspected or confirmed cases of this disease.
In addition to the formal recommendations that the Ministry of Health has been making with regard to surveillance at ports and airports, we suggest that it should make further recommendations to all Brazilian state health departments for preparations for medical care in suspected or confirmed cases of this disease. Given the size of Brazil, it is impossible to predict when the disease might enter the country and it becomes difficult to conduct centralised laboratory tests in Belém, state of Pará (no matter how competent the laboratory is) and to provide medical care at a single hospital in Rio de Janeiro (the current scenario). We suggest to the Ministry of Health to take the following measures: (i) set up a task force of physicians and senior nurses with the capacity to train teams within state health departments, regarding surveillance and medical care for patients with suspected or confirmed Ebola virus infection, (ii) help in setting up and training for diagnostic and medical care centres for this disease, within state health departments and (ii) maintain surveillance at the diagnostic and medical care centres of state health departments through retraining their teams, when necessary.
